Hardbound, $45.95 Music, it has often been suggested, is a form of language. If this is true, perhaps some of the techniques of computational linguistics might be profitably applied to musical issues. In Computers and Musical Style, com- poser David Cope describes a new way of analyzing musical style, by using computer pattern matching to identify characteristic motives, or short sequences of musical intervals. Cope has developed an automatic composer, using an ATN music grammar to recombine these motives, producing convincing music in the style of composers ranging from Mozart to Gershwin.
Cope's primary motivation in this work was a practical one: suffering from "composer's block," he felt the need for a "composer's partner." To that end, Cope has developed a series of computer programs capable of composing music in the style of a particular composer. Drawing on the frequently observed parallel between linguistic phrase structure rules and the structure underlying musical phrases, Cope defines an ATN grammar as the basis of his automatic composer. Using work by music theorists such as Schenker, Cope defines five musical categories: statement, preparation, extension, antecedent, and consequent. The grammar governs the ways in which these five basic categories can be combined to form phrases. Cope creates a lexicon by extracting characteristic patterns from existing works of a given composer, and cataloging these patterns as to category. With a composer-specific lexicon and ATN grammar, the program is capable of randomly producing new works in the style of that composer. The program has produced works in the styles of composers such as Bach, Mozart, Brahms, Chopin, and Scott Joplin. Although none of these compositions could be mistaken for genuine works of the composers they are meant to emulate, the resemblance is at times quite striking. In particular, I found the works in the style of Brahms and Chopin surprisingly evocative.
However, it is far from clear how the program produced these compositions. Composer Cope is clearly a convert to the joys of Lisp hacking, and he presents a simple version of his program virtually line by line, including many program traces. The more elaborate version of the program, which actually produced all the musical examples, is too large for such treatment. Instead, Cope contents himself with a vague, partial description of the program, leaving it quite unclear how the program actually produced all these interesting compositions.
The most innovative aspect of this work is the notion that signatures, or common patterns, can be automatically extracted from a body of work. In the current implementation, the patterns are found by comparing simple sequences of intervals of a fixed length. Even with such simple comparisons, some striking regularities emerge, suggesting that this is a promising approach to the definition and analysis of musical style. In Logic and Information, Keith Devlin attempts to develop a theory of information suitable for the study of cognition. It is intended that the theory be amenable to all varieties of information flow, though natural language semantics is given special consideration.
Apart from the introductory and concluding chapters, the book divides into two parts. Chapters 2 through 5 spell out Devlin's theory of information, a version of Situation Theory. Chapters 6 through 9 then explore the application of this theory to two areas: mental states, perception, and action, and natural language semantics. Devlin explicitly argues" that an account of the former is required by any adequate theory of the latter, and such concerns are evident in his semantic treatment of natural language.
The version of Situation Theory presented is the most complete and accessible published since Barwise and Perry's original work, including many of the advances that have been made in recent years. As Devlin is quick to acknowledge, however, it is not a definitive statement of Situation Theory per se, which continues to evolve. Unfortunately, Devlin does not highlight areas of Situation Theory where opinions differ, and it is difficult to distinguish what is the received view from Devlin's own persuasions. Furthermore, while Devlin does attempt to motivate all aspects of his theory, the motivation is not always convincing.
With regard to natural language semantics, Devlin considers the meanings of both individual words and sentences, as well as the impact of various classes of utterance. Further application of the theory is given via the specific consideration of quantification, negation, conditionals, speaker's intentions, and paradox and ambiguity. Devlin projects his attempts at these areas as first approxi- Dinsmore proposes a formalism for mental representations divided into locally consistent domains called spaces. The theory does not specify the representation within the spaces; Dinsmore relies primarily on firstorder logic, but also employs a semantic network. The primary application area is language and in this respect the work can be regarded as a formalization of Fauconnier's (1985) mental spaces, sharing a concern with presupposition, counterfactuals, and aspect. Correspondences to natural deduction, Kamp's (1981) discourse representation theory, frames, belief spaces, contextlayered databases, and mental models are also outlined.
The approach views language comprehension as the firing of a series of production rules that project an utterance through various intermediate representations or projections. Intermediate projections are mixtures of semantic structures and as-yetunprocessed surface fragments. This simplification allows Dinsmore to focus on the construction and maintenance of spaces as a sentence is processed. Rules perform three classes of operations: Contextualization makes decisions about the global placement of input forms on the basis of the pragmatic setting. Distribution allocates structures already in one space to other spaces, relying more heavily on surface cues. Parochial processing includes more familiar interpretation processes such as definite reference determination, lexical and structural disambiguation, and metonymy and metaphor interpretation. The power of the theory, however, derives • largely from the restriction that these processes are confined to operation solely within single spaces.
The book can be seen as making two primary contributions. First, it synthesizes loose ideas that have been floating around in AI Computational Linguistics Volume 18, Number 4 and cognitive science for some time, and which many theories and systems have already incorporated in specialized form. On the whole Dinsmore does a good job of sketching the relationships to other frameworks. Second, it proposes a specific architecture and set of production rules for processing a variety of language constructs. Since the major part of the book is concerned with these language examples, it is somewhat frustrating that correspondences, differences, and extensions to Fauconnier's theory are not specifically clarified. Interestingly, connections to the line of work on representing existence by Meinong (1904 Meinong ( /1960 , Parsons (1980) , Lambert (1983) , Rapaport (1985) , and Hirst (1989 Hirst ( , 1991 are also missing, though overlapping concerns are addressed (we might profitably think of spaces as holding cells for nuclear relations, with extranuclear relations being those that span spaces).
The book is well written and Dinsmore's style is generally easy to read. The rules and processes are illustrated through many examples. All the more technical and formal discussion is confined to the last three chapters, which form an appendix. This arrangement makes the book more difficult for the computer scientist, but probably improves its readability for linguists.--Dekai Wu, University of Toronto
